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Abstract In the presented paper we focus on the two ways in which family policy inﬂuences
life of the society. Firstly, we discuss incentives that the family policy provides to families when
they are deciding about having a child. Secondly, we describe the impact of family policies on
standard of living and well-being of the families with children. European countries already ac-
knowledged the fact that increase in the fertility rates would be natural solution of the ageing of
the European population and family policy is seen as one of the tools available to achieve higher
fertility rates. At the same time empirical evidence suggests that the families with children are
overrepresented among the population at risk of poverty and family policy can be seen as an
instrument for alleviating the ﬁnancial burden of the families with children. Presented study
compares the impact of the government policies on the net income of families with children in
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Comparative analysis of the birth grants, the
maternity allowances, the child-rearing allowances and child allowances in the four examined
countries is undertaken followed by the assessment of tax systems in these countries. Second
part of the paper is devoted to the discussion of the income situation of the families with children
in the four countries and tries to shed light on the impact of family beneﬁt system on the house-
holds with dependent children. Our results indicate that family provisions in the Czech Republic
and Hungary are relatively generous with the Czech system working simultaneously as a social
assistance to poor families and the Hungarian system working on much less of a sliding scale of
beneﬁts. Poland provides only very modest ﬁnancial support to families with children and the
burden imposed by the parenthood is much heavier than in the three other countries. Czech and
Slovak family support systems are similar in its structure but amounts paid to Slovak families
are lower.
Keywords Family policy, income taxation, subsidies, fertility, family beneﬁts
JEL classiﬁcation H24, J13 ∗∗∗
1. Introduction
Family policy is generally seen as an important instrument of the government policies
that inﬂuences vast share of the population. In this paper we focus on the two aspects
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of the family policy in which it impacts life of society. Firstly, we discuss incentives
that the family policy provides to families when they are deciding about having a child,
and secondly, we describe the impact of family policies on standard of living and well-
being of the families with children. We narrow the analysis of family policies and focus
on ﬁnancial aspects of the government measures. Obviously, well-being of the fami-
lies with children is inﬂuenced not only by the system of subsidies and taxes affecting
their disposable income; childcare provisions, services provided by the government
and generally speaking the friendliness of the state towards families with children de-
cides about the well-being of families with children and possibility to reconcile work
and family life (for the discussion see e.g. Szelewa and Polakowski 2008).
The structure of the paper reﬂects two above mentioned ways in which government
affects life and decisions of the families. In the ﬁrst part of the paper we focus on the
incentives that the system of subsidies and taxes provides to families making fertility
decisions. We anchor our analysis in the broader context of the population ageing in
the European countries and provide brief literature review on the relationship between
income, family policies and fertility. In the second part of the paper we pay our atten-
tion to the level of income of families with children and to the problem of poverty of
families with children. We provide empirical evidence showing actual level of stan-
dard of living of the families with children as well as discussion of efﬁciency of the
government programs focused on families with children.
2. Family policy and fertility decisions
Let us ﬁrst discuss the relationship between fertility decisions of the households and
government measures inﬂuencing their income. We begin this section by a short de-
scription explaining why the ability of the government to inﬂuence fertility decisions
became of crucial importance in the last years. The European population is ageing and
according to demographic projections for January 1, 2045, each and every Member
State of the EU-27 will experience a decline in its number of citizens.1 The general
decline in population will be accompanied by a change in demographic structure, a
growing number of old people and a diminishing share of young people in the popu-
lation. This overall development will have great implications for economic and social
systems. The decline in the working-age population will lead to downward pressure
on economic growth rates and the average annual GDP growth rate will decline from
2.4 over the period 2004–2010 to about 1.2 between 2030 and 2050 in the case that no
measures are taken to prevent and alleviate the impact of population ageing (Commis-
sion of the European Communities 2006). One of the solutions for the long term with
regards to population ageing is a growth in fertility rates. This fact is mirrored in the
ofﬁcial documents of the European Commission (Commission of the European Com-
munities 2006, p. 7) as well as national strategies on ageing that call for the promotion
of demographic renewal in Europe and the adoption of family-friendly institutions.
Hence, the question arises whether the government can inﬂuence fertility decisions
1 Eurostat 2008 – Population projections – no migration variant – 1 January population – accessed on
February 9, 2007.
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of the citizens at all. From the point of view of economic theory, inﬂuencing ferti-
lity means inﬂuencing the costs and beneﬁts of having children. The microeconomic
analysis of fertility dates back to the 1960s and Gary Becker’s article An Economic
Analysis of Fertility. Becker (1960) saw the fertility decision as equivalent to con-
sumer choice and postulated: “Since children do not appear to be inferior members of
any broader class, it is likely that a rise in long-run income would increase the amount
spent on children,” and an “...increase in income should increase both the quantity and
quality of children.”(Becker 1960, p. 211–212) Since then Becker’s assumptions and
conclusions were challenged (e.g. Easterlin 1966; Turchi 1975) and empirically tested
(e.g. Borg 1989; Shields and Tracy 1986; Freedman and Thornton 1982) by many aca-
demics and researchers. Becker’s conclusions seems to be conﬁrmed by the empirical
evidence as concerns “quality of children” but the relationship between income and
the number of children seems to be of the opposite direction (for the discussion see
e.g. Isserman 1986). While numerous competing theories of fertility decisions exist in
economic, sociological and demographic literature, most researchers see the following
determinants of fertility decisions as relevant (Sleebos 2003):
- The material and psychological beneﬁts provided by children,
- the direct and opportunity costs of children incurred by their parents,
- the broad economic environment in which reproductive decisions take place,
- individual lifestyle factors,
- societal and cultural norms.
National governments try to inﬂuence fertility decisions directly (through tax pay-
ments and subsidies related to childbearing and childrearing) and indirectly (as a side
effect of policies focused on other unrelated goals). Gauthier (2007) provides a com-
prehensive overview of family policies in industrialized countries together with a rich
analysis of various kinds of empirical evidence on the impact of family policies on
fertility.
The conclusions of empirical studies looking for a direct relationship between fer-
tility and family-directed policies are ambiguous. Public opinion polls generally show
a signiﬁcant discrepancy between the desired and the actual number of children (see
e.g. Esping-Andersen 2002). Respondents to the question of the perceived causes of
low fertility generally mention reasons related to housing, the level of governmental
child support and other economic variables (European Foundation for the Improve-
ment of Living and Working Conditions 2004, p. 40). In a Population Policy Ac-
ceptance Survey (Bundesinstitut F¨ ur Bev¨ olkerungsforschung 2006) around 11 to 44
percent of the respondents answered that they would reconsider the possibility of hav-
ing another child in the case of the introduction of new or improved family policy
measures. Descriptive studies analyzing the impact of policies on fertility that are
based on the historical experiences of particular countries generally show a positive
impact of policy on fertility. For recent evidence from European countries see, e.g.
Rønsen (2004), Rondinelli (2006), Bjørklund (2002). Studies using multivariate statis-
tical analyses also generally ﬁnd the positive impact of policies on fertility (Gauthier
2007, p. 331).
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Volumes of work have been published about changing fertility patterns in European
countries and the impact of government measures on fertility decisions (Sleebos 2003;
Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2006). We have chosen four countries to analyze in this
study; the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. These countries had a
relatively turbulent fertility development in the past 20 years (e.g. Sobotka 2002) (see
Figure 1) that was inﬂuenced by the political and economic transition from socialist to
democratic societies. Governmental family policies in these countries are relics of the
family ideologies of past communist governments combined with the modern welfare
state policies of Western states constrained by government budget possibilities (see e.g.
Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006). The development of family policies in Central and
Eastern European countries within the ﬁrst 15 years of the transition from socialism to
free market systems has been traced by Rostgaard (2004) and Steinhilber (2005) who
compare policy reforms in the Czech Republic and Poland. Pascall and Kwak (2006)
provide an insightful study of gender and family-related issues with a special emphasis
on the gender situation in Poland. Fodor et al. (2002) investigate the gendered nature of
the welfare state in Hungary, Poland and Romania, discussing historical developments
and the main differences between the three states. Hantrais (2004) explores changes
in family patterns in EU-25 countries and the responses and political debates about
corresponding family policies.




















































There are numerous studies describing particular family policy measures and the
rules applied in different countries. However, quantitative indicators surveyed usually
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cover only macro indicators such as family or social policy expenditures, beneﬁt cover-
age, average family allowances etc; the micro analysis discussing the impact of family
policies is mostly descriptive. We extend the family policy analysis by investigating
incentives that the systems of taxes and subsidies in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia provide to the families when deciding about having a child. By
comparing income loss during the ﬁrst three years after the birth of the ﬁrst child we
show that the incentives differ signiﬁcantly among countries as well as among income
groups.
There are two main variables inﬂuencing the net income of families with children:
transfers and taxes. Transfers represent direct ﬁnancial support from the government,
anditsnetimpactreﬂectsthetaxandsocialcontributionregimeappliedtothetransfers.
Hereafter, the government inﬂuences the net income of families through tax credits, tax
allowances, joint taxation schemes and other tax rules. The following sections analyze
government policies affecting the net income of families with children in the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.2
Above mentioned inconclusive empirical relationship between fertility and family
policy suggests that our contribution to the discussion of fertility issues is rather limi-
ted. As concerns ﬁnancial situation of the families with children our results are more
relevant. However, even here the conclusions are bounded by the fact that we study
only one family type and include only basic family-related subsidies and tax measures.
Full analysis of the ﬁnancial impact of the government policies would have to include
also detailed discussion of the systems of VAT, health and pension systems, speciﬁc
subsidies provided e.g. on regional basis, governmentally supported services for fa-
milies with children etc. Nevertheless, such analysis by far exceeds the extent of the
journal article.
3. Transfers
We began the analysis of family-related subsidies and taxes with the overview of
transfers and taxes while summarizing eligibility conditions and reporting respective
amounts.3 Families with children receive ﬁnancial support generally in three stages.
Firstly, maternity beneﬁts are paid during the period shortly before and after birth.
Secondly, a child-rearing allowance is paid to the parent who provides care for a child
usually up to the age of 2 to 4 years. Thirdly, a child beneﬁt is paid to families with
children usually up to the end of the child’s compulsory education.
The ﬁrst transfer family generally receives from the state is a birth grant, the one-
time beneﬁt generally covering costs connected with childbirth. The amount of the
birth grant ranged between 23 to 91 percent of the monthly AW4 in 2007 in the four
countries and was not means tested (except for the supplement to the family allowance
inPoland). TheamountsofthebirthgrantwerelowestinSlovakia(23%ofAW),alittle
2 Amounts and rates quoted valid in 2007.
3 Based on European Commission (2007a,b). If not mentioned otherwise, family with 2 adults and 1 child
considered, both parents receiving the same wage prior to the childbirth.
4 Average wage for the year 2006 as published by OECD (2007).
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bit more generous in Poland and Hungary (around 40% of AW) and most generous in
the Czech Republic with the birth grant equal to 91% of AW. As we will see later, birth
grant generally does not inﬂuence the net income of families in the long run. However,
it might help overcome initial costs connected with childbirth to low-income families.
Table 1. Transfers overview (2007)
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
Birth grant 11.1 times the mi-
nimum subsistence
level for a child
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The maternity allowance is the beneﬁt payable to mothers after childbirth for a pe-
riod of 18 weeks in Poland, 24 weeks in Hungary and 28 weeks in the Czech Republic
and Slovakia. In all four countries the amount of the allowance is related to the previ-
ous earnings. The principle of the allowance relation to the previous income is exerted
fully in Poland, where maternity allowance equals to 100 percent of the reference wage
and is subject to the taxation and deduction of contributions for health care, old age,
disability and survivors’ insurance. Hence, Polish woman does not face any decline in
the income for the ﬁrst 18 weeks after the childbirth. Similar system is applied in Hun-
gary with the replacement ratio 70% but longer eligibility period. Slovak replacement
ratio is given as 55% of the gross wage with the minimum and maximum amounts
equal to 21% and 85% of AW respectively. Czech system of maternity allowances is
part of the sickness beneﬁts system, which leads to relatively complicated calculation
of the real amount of the beneﬁt. In general, maternity allowances range between 39%
(for women whose gross monthly earnings exceeded CZK 23,967 which is 123 percent
of the AW) and 74% of AW. In between these two boundaries the amount is slightly
responsive to the gross wage level. The replacement rate for woman with a previous
gross income between 40 and 120 percent of the average wage does not differ conside-
rably among the countries. With rising incomes the gap increases due to the ceiling on
maternity beneﬁts in the Czech Republic and Slovakia that does not allow the beneﬁts
to exceed 74 and 85 percent of the average wage respectively.
The system of ﬁnancial support for parents taking care of children up to the age of
2 to 4 years is mostly based on the ﬂat-rate beneﬁts independent on family’s income.
In the Czech Republic and Slovakia child-rearing allowances were in 2007 paid to
parents who personally provided regular care for at least one child up to the age of four
years in the Czech Republic and three years in Slovakia. The amount of the beneﬁt
equaled 39% (the Czech Republic) and 23% (Slovakia) of AW. In Poland the child-
rearing allowance was a ﬂat-rate supplement to the family allowance which means that
only families with monthly income per family member lower than 25 percent of the
average wage for the previous year were eligible. The amount was equal to 16% of
AW in 2007. Non-insured parents in Hungary received child home-care allowance up
to the child’s third birthday that equaled approx. 17% of AW in 2007. Unlike the three
above described systems Hungarian child-care fee is income-related beneﬁt payable
to insured parents with the same rates applied as for the maternity allowance with the
ceiling at 68% of AW. Between the second and third birthday of their child, insured
parents taking care of their children receive the child home-care allowance.
Child allowances are paid for the longest period of time (generally up to the end
of the child’s compulsory education) in all four examined countries and the monthly
amountdoesnotexceed8percentofthemonthlyAW(forafamilywithonechildunder
6 years old). In fact, there are four possible parameters of the eligibility: income of the
family, number of the children in the family, age of the child, or parents’ status (single
vs. married couple). Child allowance is means tested in the Czech Republic and Poland
with the eligibility threshold at around 90% of AW in the Czech Republic and 42% of
AW in Poland. The amount paid to families per child depends on child’s age and
generally does not exceed 5% of AW. In Slovakia child allowance is a ﬂat rate beneﬁt
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payable to all families and equaled 3% of AW per child in 2007. In contrast to the
other three countries, Hungarian system of child allowances treats families as one unit
and the amount of the beneﬁt is speciﬁed for each family type (family characterized
by number of children and parents’ status (single vs. married)). The monthly amount
ranges between HUF 11,700 for a family with one child and HUF 15,900 per child for
a single parent with three or more children.
4. Taxation
Tax schemes in the four examined countries to some extent reﬂect family policy goals.
However, the impact on the net incomes of families with children is generally limited.
Tax credits for families with children are frequently used by the governments as a
part of family policy. In the Czech Republic a payable tax credit of CZK 6,000 per
child has been introduced in 2006 for parents of children younger than 18 years (26
years in the case that the child receives full-time education). Tax credits for children in
Hungary are provided to families with three or more children; the exact amount of tax
credit depends on family income and the number of children (the maximum amount
of tax credit is HUF 4,000 per month per child). The tax credit may be either claimed
by one parent or split between spouses. In Slovakia the allowance for children was
replaced by non-wastable tax credit in 2004: The amount of the credit was SKK 6,480
per child in 2006. An interesting aspect of the tax system is that only high income
families are eligible for the credit (parents with an annual income greater than six
times the minimum monthly wage). Poland is the only country that does not have the
children related tax credit in its tax system.
Second instrument alleviating tax burden to families with children is mainly fo-
cused on the families with big income differential between spouses’ earnings. The
possibility of joint taxation is incorporated in the Czech and Polish tax schemes. Polish
couples married for a whole year as well as single individuals with dependent children
can use the joint taxation scheme. In the Czech Republic the joint taxation of spouses
with children was introduced in 2005. It is advantageous mainly for families with a sig-
niﬁcant difference in the incomes of spouses. The tax liability is reduced in two ways:
Firstly, joint taxation may lead to a lower tax rate on taxable income and secondly, the
spouse’s tax credit can be used even if one partner earns no or very little income (in
the case of ﬁlling taxes separately this credit could not be used). For a representative
family with one parent taking parental leave (having no earnings) and the other earning
33 percent of the AW the amount saved equals 1.3 percent of gross earnings, and with
a rising income the amount saved increases. For earnings equal to 200 percent of the
AW the amount saved is about 7.9 percent of the income of the family.
5. Overall impact
To make the analysis of the overall impact of the system of beneﬁts and taxes on the
fertility incentives of the families tractable we have chosen one special family type – a
couple comparing their net income during the ﬁrst three years after the possible child-
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birth with the net income if the childbirth is postponed. The reason why we ﬁnd this
decision-making crucial for the overall impact of the government measures on the total
fertility is following. The net income of families is mostly affected by child rearing
within the ﬁrst few years after the childbirth. During this period one of the parents
generally stays at home to take care of the child and the family income consists of the
spouse’s income plus family beneﬁts. The ﬁnancial situation of a family dramatically
changes compared to the situation when both spouses contribute to the family budget.
Opinion polls persistently show that people do take ﬁnancial matters into account when
deciding about having a child. Hence, we can assume that higher income loss incurred
in the ﬁrst three years after the childbirth increases the likelihood of postponing ﬁrst
childbirth. And ﬁnally, empirical studies clearly show negative correlation between the
age at ﬁrst birth and completed fertility.
Let us ﬁrst begin by comparison of the net income of a childless married couple
over the period of three years and the net income of a family with one child over the
period of three years beginning at the birth of the child (taxation rules and social beneﬁt
system of 2007, joint taxation used for the Czech Republic).
Table 2. Net income of a family with a child (as percent of a childless couple’s income)
% of AW CZ HU PL SK
33 135 101 83 101
67 96 93 65 81
100 85 91 62 77
133 79 88 57 72
167 75 83 57 68
200 73 79 56 66
Source: Authors’ calculations, used data from European Commission (2007b), OECD (2007).
In all four countries the loss of income due to parenthood is greater for families
with higher earnings. The Czech system of family support is more advantageous for
families with lower incomes; Table 2 shows that for a family with gross earnings at 33
percent of the AW the net income increases by 35 percent if they are raising a child.
This is caused by the relatively high (40 percent of the AW) ﬂat-rate child-rearing al-
lowance. The family beneﬁt system in the Czech Republic narrows income differences
between families raising children and real ﬁnancial incentives to have their ﬁrst child
exist for the lowest income group. Hungary is the country with the lowest differences
in income gaps caused by parenthood; the gap between the previous income and the net
income if raising a child only slightly increases with rising earnings. The main reason
for this lies in the child-care fee, a relatively generous child-rearing beneﬁt for insured
parents. Polish families with children have signiﬁcantly lower net income than child-
less couples for all wage levels; the gap between childless families and families with
children increases with rising earnings. Table 2 shows that for families with earnings
higher than 133 percent of the AW the net income of the family is only slightly above
50 percent, which indicates that government support is inconceivable. All investigated
family types lose money compared to their childless counterparts. The Slovak family
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support system resembles the Czech one with slightly lower levels of support for all
income groups.
In all four countries the income loss due to parenthood is smaller for low income
families. In the Czech Republic it is even beneﬁcial to stay at home to take care of
the child for the families with very low income. Poland clearly stands out as a country
with very limited support provided to families with children regardless of the income
group.
The level of various family support beneﬁts is often discussed by policymakers and
constitutes a main interest especially in a pre-election period. However, changes in
different beneﬁts inﬂuence the net income of families over longer periods of time in
different ways. In the following section we try to identify key elements of the govern-
mental family support systems in these four countries.











































































































































































Gross income of the working spouse (% of AW)
birth grant child benefits maternity allowance child-rearing allowance spouse's income
Source: Authors’ calculations, used data from European Commission (2007b), OECD (2007).
Figure 2 shows the income sources for families with one child over a 3-year period
from childbirth in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. We took total
net income of the family including family and social transfers as 100% and observed
what part of this income comes from the spouse’s income, child-rearing allowances,
maternity allowances, child beneﬁts and birth grant. In all four examined countries
birth grant and child beneﬁts constitute only a very limited resource of family income;
child beneﬁt reaching its maximum at 13% of the family income for the lowest income
family type in Hungary. Maternity allowance constitutes relatively stable part of the
family income in all countries over all income groups. Its contribution to the overall
income ranges from 5 percent (the Czech Republic, Slovakia) to 10 percent (Poland,
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highest income group). As concerns child-rearing allowance Figure 2 clearly shows
totally missing beneﬁt for Polish families with the spouse earning more than 133%
of average wage. In Poland, the contribution of child-rearing allowance to total in-
come rapidly declines with rising earnings of the spouse. Compared to other countries
Hungarian system of child-rearing allowances is less progressive, with the share of
child-rearing allowance only slowly declining with rising earnings of the spouse.
Hence, the message for the families with children says that the parents taking their
parental leave should be mostly concerned with the level of child-rearing allowances
in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. In the case of Hungary child beneﬁts
are of the importance as well. Popular discussions on the amount of birth grant seem
to be irrelevant in the long time perspective.



















































































































































































































Gross income of the working spouse  (% of AW)
1st year  2nd year 3rd year
Source: Authors’ calculations, used data from European Commission (2007b), OECD (2007).
Figure 3 shows the evolution of family’s income over the period of ﬁrst three years
after the childbirth under the assumption that one of the spouses stays at home taking
care of the child and the other earns 33, 67, 100, 133, 167 or 200% of average wage in
the economy. Vertical axis compares family income in the ﬁrst, second and third year
after the childbirth as a percentage share of the family income prior to childbirth (under
the assumption that both spouses earned the same wage). We can see that the evolution
of family income in all four countries is characterized by more or less gradual decline
in the family income which is the consequence of declining ﬁnancial support from the
government. The most stable income over the three-year period occurs for the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, which is mostly the consequence of the ceiling on maternity
allowance combined with child-rearing allowance staying stable over the whole three-
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year period. Income of the low income families in the Czech Republic is importantly
enhanced by the generous birth grant in the ﬁrst year. In Hungary, we can see sharp
drop in the family income after the second year as a consequence of the switch from
the child-care fee to the child home-care allowance. Similar drop occurs after the ﬁrst
year for Polish families that are eligible for quite general maternity allowance in the
ﬁrst year but most of which do not qualify for the child-rearing allowance leaving
families with the spouse’s earnings exceeding 133 percent of AW totally dependent on
the spouse’s earnings with no additional government ﬁnancial support.
We can conclude that in the Czech Republic and Slovakia lowest income families
are not motivated to return to work sooner than after the child’s third birthday whereas
the incentives for higher income families are stronger. Similarly, Hungarian family
support system strongly motivates parents to return to work after the child’s second
birthday. Polish family support system signiﬁcantly differs from other three countries.
The loss of income for the lowest income families in the ﬁrst year is comparable to the
income loss incurred by Slovak and Hungarian families. However, in the second and
third year Polish low income families are signiﬁcantly worse-off than their Hungarian
and Slovak counterparts. For the Polish families with spouse’s earnings exceeding 67%
of AW the decline in income due to parenthood is most profound of all four countries.
Financial resources available to the families seem to be quite low especially if we
realize that this “tough regime” applies on the families exceeding 67 percent of AW. As
a consequence, both parents are strongly motivated to return to work immediately after
the ﬁrst 18 weeks of maternity leave during which they receive maternity allowance.
Labor market consequences of the paid parental leave were investigated by Pronzato
(2007) who has shown that the right to paid leave decreases the probability of being
at work by 35 percentage points when the child is between 0 and 3 years old. Polish
women are therefore more likely to return to work compared to woman in the three
other countries.
We have shown that the net income loss due to parenthood signiﬁcantly differs
among countries as well as among different income groups. Let us now brieﬂy show
how many of the young couples are inﬂuenced by the analyzed incentive structures.
Data taken from the EU-SILC database5 provided by the Eurostat indicate that around
5 percent of the young couples in the Czech Republic fall within the lowest income
group that has the strongest ﬁnancial incentive to give birth to their ﬁrst child. Another
9 percent of the couples in Hungary and 7 percent of the couples in Slovakia do not
loose in the case of the decision to have their ﬁrst child because their gross income does
not exceed 33% of AW. If we look at the share of the young couples with the gross
income lower than 67 percent of AW per person we see striking difference between
the Czech Republic (28 percent of young couples in this income group) and Hungary
and Poland (55 and 51 percent). This pattern is also reﬂected by the median income
reaching 82 percent of AW for the Czech Republic and 62, 65 and 69 percent for
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. At the same time the Czech Republic shows slightly
higher share of the young couples falling within the high income group category (with
gross income per person exceeding 133 percent of AW).
5 The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions; data for 2005.
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To sum up, the Czech system provides strong ﬁnancial incentives to have a child
for a very limited part of the population characterized by very low incomes. Hungarian
and Slovak systems are less generous to low income groups but much more couples
fall within this category. In Poland, all couples face important income loss due to
parenthood if one of the parents decides to stay at home with a child.
6. Family policy and well-being of the families with children
The second part of this article tries to picture the ﬁnancial impact of the government
on the families with children in the context of the standard of living of the families
with children. We examine the evidence on the ﬁnancial situation of the families with
children in the four countries and try to answer the question how well-off the families
with children are. We compare income indicators for various household types and try
to answer the question whether the ﬁnancial support of the government is necessary
and to what extent poor families are supported by the government.
Let us ﬁrst stress that in all four countries households with dependent children ac-
count for over ﬁfty percent of the population (62 percent in Poland, 61 percent in Slo-
vakia, 56 percent in Hungary and 52 percent in the Czech Republic (Eurostat 2008)).
The distribution of household types among total population reveals different patterns
in the four countries. Polish and Slovak populations are characterized by very high
share of households with three or more adults with dependent children (around 25 per-
cent of the households) compared to the Czech Republic (11 percent) and Hungary (15
percent). If we look at the households with two adults and one, two or more dependent
children, their representation in the populations of the four countries is very similar: 9
to 12 percent of households with one dependent child, 15 to 21 percent of households
with two children and 5 to 9 percent of households with three children.
EU-SILC data for 2005 show that households with children have on average higher
gross earnings than households without dependent children. The difference is even
more pronounced for households with one adult person.
The ﬁrst step in assessing real standard of living of the families is to take into ac-
count system of government taxes and beneﬁts applied on the gross earnings. OECD
(2007) has provided data on tax burdens for different family types for the time period
2000 to 2006. Because our analysis focuses on the comparison of the income condi-
tions of the families with children and households without children we have chosen
two household types for which OECD (2007) allows this type of comparison. Table 3
shows the evolution of tax burdens for a single person at 67 percent of average earn-
ings and a dual-earning married couple with one spouse at 100 percent of the average
earnings and the other at 33 percent of the average earnings without children and with
two children.
In the Czech Republic the tax burden of single persons and families without child-
ren is signiﬁcantly higher than the tax burden of people with children with regards to
families with the earnings indicated in the table. There was about a 10 percentage-
points difference in the tax burden for a dual-earning couple with and without children
in 2006. For single individuals the difference is even more visible with a 28 percentage
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point gap. Since 2000 there has been a tendency towards the convergence of the tax
burden. Still, a profound differentiation in the tax burden between families with and
without children especially with regards to single persons persists.
Table 3. Income tax plus employee contributions minus cash beneﬁts as a percentage of gross
wage earnings
2000 20001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Single persons without children
at 67% of average earnings
CZ 20.8 20.7 21 21.2 21.5 21.7 19.1
HU 30 30.5 27.9 23.7 24.3 22.2 22.8
PL 30.4 29.9 29.8 30.1 30.4 30.5 30.8
SK 17.9 18.9 18.1 18.3 18.4 18.3 18.7
Single persons with 2 children
at 67% of average earnings
CZ -17.2 -15.5 -14.9 -12.8 -10.3 -10.9 -9
HU 4.8 3.6 2.1 -1.8 0 -1.1 -1.7
PL 22.4 21.7 21.4 21.8 27.6 27.7 28.1
SK -3.9 -1 -2.1 -0.9 1.2 1.5 1.9
Two-earner married couple
with no children, one at 100%
average earnings and the other
at 33%
CZ 21 20.9 21.3 21.7 22.2 22.5 20.3
HU 31.9 34.2 32.2 27.9 29.2 28.6 29.1
PL 30.4 29.9 29.8 30.1 30.4 30.5 30.8
SK 17.9 19.4 19.1 19.5 19 18.9 19.3
Two-earner married couple
with 2 children, one at 100%
average earnings and the other
at 33%
CZ 7.7 9.4 9.4 11.2 13.2 12.5 10.3
HU 20.4 21.8 20.4 16.2 18.2 18 17.8
PL 27.7 27.2 29.8 30.1 30.4 30.5 30.8
SK 10.1 11.9 10.5 11.1 10.2 10.3 10.9
Source: OECD (2007)
The difference in the tax burden in Hungary in 2006 was 24.5 percentage points
for single persons with earnings of 33 percent of average earnings and 11.3 percentage
pointsforadual-earningmarriedcouplewithonespouseat100percentoftheiraverage
earnings and the other at 33 percent of their average earnings. Compared to the year
2000, the tax burden decreased for all family types with the most profound decline for
single persons.
In Poland the tax burden differentials between families with and without children
are very small, and these differences even narrowed during the 2000 and 2006 period
when the tax burden on single persons with two children was increased from 22 to
28 percent. This indicates that despite decreasing fertility rates and commitments of
Council of Ministers “to assure the growth of wealth of Polish families, to strengthen
their material independence and their feeling of security” (Zieschank 2004) the real
determination to support families with children in Poland is still weak.
Slovakia shows a stable tax burden for all types of families over the observed pe-
riod. There is 16.8 percentage point gap between single persons with earnings that are
33 percent of the average earnings and 8.4 percentage points gap between dual-earning
married couples with zero and two children.
When comparing the tax burdens for family types summarized in Table 3, we can
conclude that in most cases the tax and subsidy systems are set to favor families with
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children; it is only in the case of Poland that tax rates are within the range of 3 percent-
age points for all family types, which indicates low support for the analyzed types of
families with children compared to other three countries.
Therefore, the difference in total income between the households with and with-
out children should be even higher after the application of appropriate tax schemes
especially in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. In contrast to these ﬁrst re-
sults, statistics show that the households with dependent children in the four countries
are overrepresented in the at-risk-of-poverty population Eurostat (2008). Seventy to se-
venty six percent of the households fall within this category in the four examined coun-
tries compared to 24 to 30 percent of the households without dependent children. An
interesting pattern is revealed by the examination of household types at risk of poverty
in the four countries. In the Czech Republic and Hungary much more households at
risk of poverty are single parents with children whereas in Poland and Slovakia, most
frequent households within this category are households with three or more adults and
dependent children.
Reasonably, poverty is not assessed based on the gross income and not even based
on the disposable income per household. To reﬂect costs of living that differ according
tothenumberofmembersofthehouseholdEurostat, OECDandotherstatisticalofﬁces
use equivalized income to compare standard of living of various households. Presented
equivalized income is computed based on the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale which
assigns a weight of 1 to the ﬁrst adult in a household, 0.5 to other adults and 0.3 to
children. Through this simple mechanism differing costs connected with the number
of household members are imputed into the income data.
Looking at the median equivalized income of the families with children compared
to their childless counterparts (Eurostat 2008) statistics indicate expected pattern. The
country with the lowest difference in median equivalized net income between house-
holds with and without children is the Czech Republic followed by Slovakia and Hun-
gary. In Poland median equivalized net income of the households with children is 82
percent of the income of households without dependent children. To complete the pic-
ture we must add that the income gap for Polish families with two and more children
is by far the greatest of all countries. Median equivalized net income of the family
with two adults and three and more children in Poland is 55 percent of the median
equivalized income of the family with two adults without children. Compared to the
other countries, Poland is characterized by the highest loss in median equivalized net
income with each additional child in the family. Part of this income gap can be most
likely explained by lower government beneﬁts provided to the families with children
in Poland compared to other three countries.
In the following paragraphs we will examine level and scope of the government
support to families with children. First rough indicator of the government support are
government expenditures on social policies aimed at families and children. Table 4
summarizes government expenditures on the support of families and children in 2004
as a percentage share of the GDP. It mirrors a similar pattern visible in the previous
section, with the highest expenditures in Hungary (non means-tested beneﬁts account
for 2.2 percent of the GDP) followed by Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland with
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only 0.9 percent of the GDP devoted to family and children supporting policies.
In comparison with other European countries the expenditures aimed at families
and children in Poland are the lowest of all EU-27 countries. Only in Hungary do
expenditures on family policies exceed the EU-27 average.
Table 4. Government expenditures on families/children, 2004, percent of GDP
CR HU PL SK
Social protection beneﬁts 1.6 2.5 0.9 1.8
Non means-tested 0.8 2.2 0.3 1.8
Means-tested 0.8 0.3 0.6 0
Cash beneﬁts 1.4 1.9 0.9 1.6
Non means-tested 0.6 1.6 0.3 1.6
Means-tested 0.8 0.3 0.6 0
Periodic 1.2 1.8 0.9 1.6
Non means-tested 0.5 1.6 0.2 1.6
Means-tested 0.6 0.3 0.6 0
Lump sum 0.2 0 0 0
Non means-tested 0 0 0 0
Means-tested 0.1 0 0
Beneﬁts in kind 0.2 0.6 0.1
Non means-tested 0.2 0.6 0.1
Means-tested 0 0
Source: Eurostat (2008)
However, Table 4 does not tell us anything about the structure and coverage of the
beneﬁts. Do all families receive the same small vs. big amount of money? Or does
the government focus on low income families providing more ﬁnancial resources to
the families in need compared to the families that are relatively better-off? By how
much is the government support higher during parental leave period compared to the
subsequent periods? To answer these and other questions we will again use EU-SILC
data. Let us ﬁrst summarize the information on coverage and average amount of the
subsidy. Hungarian system is characterized by a generous coverage as well as the
highest average amount of the subsidy. Over 92 percent of Hungarian households
with dependent children receive family or children related allowances that on average
amount 1 073 EUR per household per year. Czech and Slovak Republic have very
similar systems with the Czech one being a little bit biased towards lower coverage and
higher average amount of the beneﬁt (83 percent of households are covered; average
amount of the beneﬁt per household is 791 EUR per year). Slovak system exhibits by
far the greatest coverage: 97 percent of the households receive children related beneﬁts
from the government and the average amount of the beneﬁt is 457 EUR per household
and year. Polish low government expenditures on children related beneﬁts are reﬂected
in a very low coverage compared to other three countries (only ﬁfty percent of the
households with dependent children are covered) and also lowest average amount of
the beneﬁt per household (386 EUR per household per year).
To answer the second question we will focus on the family allowances provided
to the families with children living below the poverty threshold as deﬁned by Eurostat
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(income below 60 percent of the national median equivalized disposable income). As
suggested in the previous sections the Czech system of child related beneﬁts serves si-
multaneously as a social assistance. Not surprisingly, low income families in the Czech
Republic are widely covered and family and children related allowances are provided
to 97 percent of families below the poverty threshold. At the same time the average
amount of the beneﬁt for households below the poverty threshold is by about 58 per-
cent higher than the average beneﬁt. Unexpectedly, in Slovakia the coverage of below
poverty threshold families is lower than the coverage for whole population showing in-
ability of the government to detect effectively families in need and provide them with
the support. The amount of the beneﬁt exceeds national average by only 4 percent
in Slovakia. Hungarian system with its wide general coverage provides beneﬁts to 94
percentoffamilieslivingbelowpovertythresholdandtheamountprovidedexceedsna-
tional average by 30 percent. The highest number of households living below poverty
threshold and not receiving family and child related allowances lives in Poland (26
percent of families below poverty threshold). The amount provided to the low income
families is insigniﬁcantly higher than the national average. The efﬁciency of child re-
lated beneﬁts in combating child poverty was investigated by Rostgaard (2004) who
stresses that for example generous Hungarian system of child allowances signiﬁcantly
reduces the child poverty rate in the country. The study quotes UNICEF’s calcula-
tions indicating that the child poverty rate in Hungary would rise from 14 percent to
22 percent without the family allowance.
Asstatedaboveﬁrstfewyearsafterthechildbirtharespecialperiodinthelifeofthe
household because small child needs full-time care and one of the parents very often
stays at home to take care of the child. As a result income of the family substantially
declines and government support is most needed. Using EU-SILC data we can easily
compare average beneﬁts with the beneﬁts paid to families taking care of the children
younger than three years. We found out the greatest difference in beneﬁts in Slovakia
where the average beneﬁt for family with the child younger than three years constitutes
almost 270 percent of the average beneﬁt. In Hungary the difference is only a little
lower with the families with children younger than three years taking 220 percent of the
average beneﬁt. The Czech Republic favored families with small children by providing
beneﬁt exceeding the average by 60 percent in 2005. Nevertheless, we should bear in
mind that the total amount of beneﬁts to families taking care of children younger than
three years has considerably increased since 2007 in the Czech Republic. Finally,
Polish families with children younger than three years receive the beneﬁt by about
46 percent higher than is the national average. We have to stress that this amount
is calculated based on the families receiving the beneﬁt greater than zero. Poland is
exceptional by the large share of families with very young children that do not receive
beneﬁts at all (around 35 percent of households).
7. Conclusions
The ﬁnancial beneﬁts and tax relief the government provides to families with children
have three major implications for a society.
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Firstly, they inﬂuence people’s decisions about childbearing and thus fertility rates.
Esping-Andersen (2002) identiﬁes three key obstacles that citizens face in forming
families — the costs that children impose, increased difﬁculties young people face
in “getting started” and the incompatibility between motherhood and work (Esping-
Andersen 2002, p. 63–66). All of these factors are affected by family policies and its
ﬁnancial consequences for the net incomes of families with children. Based on our
analysis we can conclude that the Hungarian system is the most supportive. Families
in Hungary face the lowest net income loss due to parenthood. When looking at fer-
tility rates in the four countries, we see that since 2002 fertility rates in Hungary are
slightly above fertility rates in other three countries. It would be an exaggeration to
claim that this is caused by the net income considerations of families. Rather, we can
conclude that the system of taxes and beneﬁts reﬂects the general preferences of the
government and is one of the factors contributing to higher fertility rates in Hungary.
On the contrary, Polish families’ budgets are most inﬂuenced by parenthood, which
has been reﬂected by a total fertility rate below 1.3 in 2006.
Secondly, the structure and scope of the beneﬁts greatly affects child poverty in
all four countries. Hungary and the Czech Republic have much lower child poverty
rates than Slovakia and Poland (European Observatory on the Social Situation 2005,
p. 27). The Czech beneﬁts and tax system seem to incorporate a social assistance
function in addition to the family support function because family beneﬁts are mostly
set as ﬂat beneﬁts that relatively favor low-income families. A similar bias is present in
the Slovak system of family beneﬁts. However, on average the lower level of support
decreases the total impact on the child poverty rate in Slovakia.
Thirdly, the system of family beneﬁts inﬂuences gender inequality. We did not
focus on the dimensions of the governmental family support system that are mostly
relevant for gender inequality issues: eligibility criterions, provisions concerning sin-
gle parents, etc. (for a discussion see Fodor et al. 2002). However, the overall level of
beneﬁts affects women’s options on the labor market. Higher beneﬁts allow the ﬁnanc-
ing of private nurseries and the part-time participation of women on the labor market;
a lower dependence on labor income allows fathers to participate more in child-raising
(e.g. by cutting back their working hours), etc.
In sum, we examined the impact of government tax and beneﬁt systems in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland regarding the net income of families
with children and compared their situation with childless couples. Thus, we have been
able to evaluate the opportunity costs of parenthood for one particular family type over
the ﬁrst three years after childbirth. We have found more generous provisions in the
Czech Republic and Hungary, with the Czech system working simultaneously as social
assistance to poor families and the Hungarian system working on much less of a sliding
scale of beneﬁts. Czech and Slovak family support systems are similar in its structure
but amounts paid to Slovak families are considerably lower. Poland provides only
modest ﬁnancial support to families with children. Bearing in mind empirical ﬁndings
presented in the ﬁrst part of this article, we can deduce that positive impact of family
policies on fertility rates will be much less pronounced in Poland. Hereafter, efﬁciency
of government policies focused on ageing might turn out to be of limited scope and
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demographic change in Poland might have unfavorable consequences for the whole
society and its economic system. Similarly, the standard of living of the families with
children in Poland is affected by the low support from the government.
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